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RESTRAINT OF CONTROVERSIAL MUSICAL EXPRESSION AFTER
SKYYWALKER RECORDS, INC. v. NAVARRO AND BARNES




There's music in the sighing of a reed;
There's music in the gushing of a rill;
There's music in all things, if men had ears;
Their earth is but an echo of the spheres.'
There has been considerable debate concerning the propriety of,
and protection which should be afforded, allegedly sexually graphic,
violent or profane forms of artistic expression. 2 Various forms of
popular art, notably music and photography, received widespread
publicity for shocking and highly explicit content. 3 In Ward v. Rock
Against Racism,4 the United States Supreme Court recognized that,
"[m]usic is one of the oldest forms of human expression" which has
historically been subject to censorship due to its appeal to the intellect
and emotions.5
In the last several years, the lyrical content of popular music and art
has received heightened scrutiny from both legislators and private
citizens. 6 Perhaps the most noted incident in this explosive arena
involves the well-known rap music group, 2 Live Crew which gained
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Professorial Lecturer, Washington College of Law, The American University. Former As-
sistant General Counsel, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. B.A., 1975,
J.D., 1978, University of Virginia. I sincerely appreciate the help of Steven V. Saia, student
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1. LORD BYRON, LORD BYRON: DON JUAN 498, Canto XV, Stanza V.
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Chuck Phillips, 'Rap Jam '91' Show
Called Off in Ohio, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1991, at F II (reporting the cancellation of a rap
concert that had been targeted for possible obscenity); 2 Live Crew Appeals, NEWSDAY, Mar.
26, 1991, at 16 (reporting "2 Live Crew's" appeal of a federal ruling that their album is
obscene).
3. Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.R.I. 1990)
(enjoining the Town of Westerly from conducting a show cause hearing to review
circumstances relevant to an establishment's entertainment license, prior to the
performance of a 2 Live Crew concert); see also Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati Gallery Indicted in
Mapplethorpe Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at 1. More recently, the rap artist Ice-T has
come under intense scrutiny as a result of the inclusion of the song, Cop Killer on his latest
compact disk. Carla Hall & Richard Harrington, Ice-T Drops 'Cop Killer', WASH. POST, July
29, 1992, at Al.
4. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
5. Id. at 790.
6. Atlantic Beach Casino, 749 F. Supp. at 39 (focuses on the lyrical content of music).
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considerable disrepute from the release and performance of material
from its album entitled, As Nasty as They Wanna Be. Noted for its sexually
explicit lyrics, As Nasty as They Wanna Be garnered sales well in excess of
one million copies7 and led to sell-out concerts. The group's highly
publicized performance of this material led to the first federal court
ruling regarding obscenity in popular music in the case of Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro.8 In the words of United States District Court
Judge Gonzalez:
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919), that the
First Amendment is not absolute and that it does not permit
one to yell "Fire" in a crowded theater. Today, this court de-
cides whether the First Amendment absolutely permits one to
yell another "F" word anywhere in the community when com-
bined with graphic sexual descriptions. 9
The plight of 2 Live Crew is not an isolated situation. Other artists,
including painters, sculptors, photographers and writers have been in-
volved in this continuing controversy within the artistic community. 10
More recently, critics of rap artist, Ice-T's song, Cop Killer, have lobbied
publicly for the condemnation of the work and its exclusion from the
artist's album.'1
Within the legal community, discussion of controversial forms of
expression has centered on the question of whether such expression
merits Constitutional protection. 12 As in Skyywalker, cases have ex-
amined and evaluated the content of such works to determine if the art
is obscene and, consequently, not protected by the Constitution.' 3 As
established by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
14
courts apply local standards of obscenity to determine whether artistic
expression is obscene. 15 Although obscenity determinations are made
7. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990),
rev'd, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (1lth Cir. 1992); David Gates & Peter
Katel, The Importance of Being Nasty, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 52.
8. 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960
F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 582.
10. In fact, the display of certain photographic art by Robert Mapplethorpe generated
considerable controversy which led to the cancellation of showings and the limitation of
funding provided galleries and institutions which displayed the art. Dennis Barrie, a mu-
seum curator in Cincinnati, Ohio, faced a jury trial on misdemeanor obscenity charges
resulting from a showing of Mapplethorpe's work. Tom Mathews, Fine Art or Foul?, NEWS-
WEEK, July 2, 1990, at 46. Ajury subsequently found Mr. Barrie innocent of these charges.
11. While there has been no judicial determination of the protected status of Ice-T's
song, Cop Killer, various politicians, celebrities and members of police organizations have
sharply criticized the song's lyrics as an incitement to violence. The artist maintains that
the song merely expresses anger. Ultimately, the artist and Time-Warner, the record com-
pany which manufacturers and distributes Ice-T's recordings, have voluntarily agreed to
delete Cop Killer from Ice-T's album. See supra note 3; Steve Marshall, 'Cop Killer' Cut Pulled
from Album, USA TODAY, July 29, 1992, at IA.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 17 and 24.
13. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 587-96.
14. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
15. Id. at 24-25 (noting that two elements of the Miller test, the "average person" and
the "contemporary community standards," apply local community standards to determine
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by local authorities, 16 the ultimate determination remains both difficult
and elusive.17
In the aftermath of Skyywalker, its ultimate reversal, and the more
recent public outcry over Ice-T's song, Cop Killer, there remains a serious
question regarding the extent of protection afforded artistic or musical
expression in circumstances where the content may by suggestive, pro-
vocative or controversial. 18 The Supreme Court's decision in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc. 19 indicates an apparent willingness to examine the con-
tent of controversial, expressive conduct.20 This inquiry involves a pre-
carious balance of the right to freely express ideas and opinions through
song, particularly live performances, and the myriad of societal interests
which justify the suppression of allegedly obscene, profane or inflam-
matory expression.
2 1
Because of the Constitutional significance of the right to free ex-
pression, any government attempting to prevent the promotion or dis-
tribution of controversial art bears a significant burden to justify the
prior restraint of such expression. 22 This burden notwithstanding, a
critical question remains as to whether these restraints may inhibit or
chill expression of artists such as 2 Live Crew or Ice-T.
A limitation on expression may not be enforced prior to a judicial
determination of the protected nature of such expression. 23 Given the
results in Skyywalker and Barnes, and despite the criticisms voiced by
whether certain expression is obscene; a third element does not use local community stan-
dards, rather, it analyzes whether the work taken in its entirety has literary worth).
16. Id' at 24, 30.
17. Anne L. Clark, Note, "As Nasty As They Wanna Be". Popular Music On Trial, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1481, 1514-20 (1990); see also Denise Z. Kabakoe, Note, Obscenity Decisions
Based On Procedural Mechanisms Are Patently Offensive, 10 Loy. ENT. LJ. 679 (1990)(noting
that courts can escape defining obscenity through procedural mechanisms).
18. The group 2 Live Crew may provide courts with additional musical material for
scrutiny with the anticipated release of a new album, Sports Weekend. See Edna Gundersen,
Pop's Profile Gets a Boost from Jackson, U2 Albums, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 1991, at 5D.
19. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
20. Id at 2462-63. Although Barnes primarily involves the issue of Constitutional pro-
tection of expressive conduct, the Court's Constitutional law analysis could prospectively
apply to artistic speech such as music. See generally infra text accompanying notes 241-50.
21. See Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D.R.I. 1990)
(balancing the harms and interests to each party to determine whether to grant or deny an
injunction).
22. Id. at 41 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
23. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990) revud on
other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992) (quoting South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975), which reaffirmed that the
minimum procedural safeguards necessary for a system of prior restraint to pass due pro-
cess scrutiny must provide that:
[flirst the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that the ma-
terial is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judi-
cial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period and only for the
purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination
must be assured),
Id. at 600-01; see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980) (noting
that a "temporary" prior restraint relevant to adults only theaters bears a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutionality, even if the prior restraint was issued by a state court
judge); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (attacking
the lack of procedural safeguards in the attempt to restrict the performance of "Hair");
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some scholars in the legal community,24 the prior restraint doctrine has
become an important protection from the impermissible abridgement of
free musical expression.
This article demonstrates the continued viability of the prior re-
straint doctrine in the protection of controversial musical expression
through the examination of the Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach decisions.
Through discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes, this arti-
cle illustrates the growing willingness of the federal judiciary to examine
and possibly restrict the content of artistic expression. Particular atten-
tion is given to the influence and effect of the prior restraint doctrine as
applied to 2 Live Crew's musical expression.
In order to establish the foundation from which the prior restraint
doctrine evolved, Section II of the article provides a basic background of
the primary federal law applicable to First Amendment guarantees of
free expression and the limitations which can be placed upon musical
expression. Section II then delineates the specific components of the
prior restraint doctrine and relates them to the attempted restriction of
free musical expression.
Section III traces the factual predicate and judicial reasoning con-
tained in the principal cases of Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach. An exami-
nation of these cases introduces the controversy surrounding 2 Live
Crew. This section also examines the recent case of Luke Records, Inc. v.
Navarro25 which reversed the Skyywalker court's finding that As Nasty As
They Wanna Be is obscene under Miller standards. The discussion then
focuses on the controversy and ultimate holding in Barnes as it relates to
the Supreme Court's willingness to examine, and possibly restrict, con-
troversial musical expression.
Section IV of the article analyzes the respective decisions in
Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach and the courts' analyses of the protected
status of As Nasty As They Wanna Be. This section identifies the problems
of the Skyywalker court's obscenity analysis, as well as Atlantic Beach's
brief acknowledgement of the protected status of 2 Live Crew's per-
formance. The discussion includes the Skyywalker's and Atlantic Beach's
confirmation of the significance of prior restraint procedural require-
ments. The section's analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Barnes
highlights the vulnerability of controversial expression. Such vulnera-
bility underscores the importance of the prior restraint doctrine as a
stalwart check on free speech abridgments.
Section IV ultimately recognizes the possible flaws in the prior re-
straint doctrine and the need for promptness in the imposition of proce-
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1965) (challenging the constitutionality of the
State of Maryland motion picture censorship statute).
24. See Manin Scordato, Distinction Without A Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 34 (1989) (criticizing the prior restraint doctrine for
a lack of coherence and constitutional relevance). See generally Kabakow, supra note 17
which chides the "protection of speech" by use of procedural requirements which are in-
herent in the prior restraint doctrine.
25. 960 F.2d 134 (1lth Cir. 1992).
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dural safeguards. The Article concludes with comments delineating the
importance of the prior restraint doctrine as a primary, if not solitary,
mechanism which may prevent unwarranted restrictions on Constitu-
tionally protected musical expression.
II. BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL LAW APPLICABLE
TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.
A. Constitutional Guarantee of Freedom of Expression.
The Constitution of the United States provides, inter alia, "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."'2 6 The
freedom of speech or expression comprises the bulwark of individual
rights granted under the Constitution. 27 Central to the freedoms pro-
tected by the Constitution, the freedom of speech is the "indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."
'28
As a basic canon of federal common law relevant to the First
Amendment, speech generally enjoys significant protection from sup-
pression. 29 Because of the importance of the right to free expression,
even unpopular ideas and expressions are typically accorded Constitu-
tional protection."0 Music, including popular musical forms such as
"rap," constitutes expression that is afforded First Amendment protec-
tion from unwarranted suppression.3 1 Individuals do not, however, en-
joy absolute rights to express any and all ideas in any context. In
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,3 2 the Supreme Court noted that free-
dom of speech is not absolute and does not provide an "unlimited li-
cense to talk."' 33 The Supreme Court further stated in Konigsberg that
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
27. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (acknowledging that the free-
dom of speech represents an individual right which is superior to others); see also Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, CJ., dissenting) (referring to the freedom of
speech having a "preferred position"), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
28. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (characterizing the
importance of free speech rights to other Constitutionally protected rights), rev'd on other
grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
29. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (regarding an ordinance
preventing pickets near schools); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
(1964) (noting, inter alia, the "actual malice" requirement for defamation); Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1952) (stating that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that no state shall abridge the freedom of speech by state action).
See generally Clark, supra note 17, at 1505.
30. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (noting that the Government could
not suppress an offensive idea or position); Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116 (prohibiting commu-
nity suppression of unpopular views).
31. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 597 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(acknowledging that music is presumptively protected under the Constitution), rev'd on
other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (stating that the First Amendment protects musi-
cal expression).
32. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
33. Id. at 49-50.
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regulations related to speech are not presumptively repugnant to the
Constitution if such laws are substantiated by a sufficiently valid govern-
mental interest.
3 4
Because the right to free expression is not absolute, the Court rec-
ognizes that protected speech, i.e., speech which does not present a
"clear and present danger,"3 5 nor constitutes "fighting words" which
incite lawless actions,3 6 nor is obscene,3 7 can be subject to reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions within a public forum.3 8 To prevent
abusive intrusions upon free speech, governmental regulations must be
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government in-
terest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication. 9
Content-based restrictions on protected speech are generally unconsti-
tutional.40 Consequently, governmental authorities may only prescribe
narrowly defined time, place and manner restrictions for such protected
speech.
4 1
B. Unprotected Speech: "Clear and Present Danger" and "Fighting Words."
Certain forms of expression are not afforded Constitutional protec-
tion. Legislators may prevent the expression of ideas that are "used in
[certain circumstances] and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils .... "42
34. Id. at 51. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 376 (1927), (Brandeis and
Holmes,J.J., concurring) (indicating that an individual's right to free speech was not abso-
lute; in some contexts, governmental interests may be superior to an individual's right to
speak freely), rev'd on other grounds, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35. See infra notes 39-40.
36. See infra notes 41-43.
37. See infra notes 44-57.
38. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (noting the
limited power of the Government to control speech on public property such as streets and
parks).
39. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
40. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 659 (1984) (striking down statutes which
prohibit reproducing photographs of government currency); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980) (finding a statute which prohibited picketing of residences except for peaceful pick-
eting of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute to be invalid, content-based
restriction); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a content-
based ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school). But see Skyywalker
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 597 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (citing Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 687, 715-16 (1931) (stating that obscene speech may be limited by the govern-
ment), rev'd on other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992).
41. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980)
(stating that the Public Service Commission's restriction on the utility company's actions
to express its view regarding nuclear energy in customers' billing notices was unconstitu-
tional since the restriction was not a valid time, place and manner limitation); Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (invalidating a township's ordi-
nance which prohibited the posting of "For Sale" signs in an effort to stem "white flight"
from an integrated neighborhood); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (a Virginia statute which forbade the adver-
tising of prescription drug prices exceeded the bounds of constitutional time, place, and
manner restrictions); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98 (1972) (striking
down a city ordinance which prohibits most picketing within a 150 foot radius of a school).
42. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (speech which thwarted the war
[Vol. 70:1
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Such unprotected speech, including speech likely to incite or produce
imminent dangers or lawless action, may be prohibited by the Govern-
ment.43 Other expressions which may not present a "clear and present
danger" yet do not enjoy First Amendment protection include "fighting
words" or speech "which by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury or
tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'4 4 Such speech, the
Court has ruled, is of little social value and the right to free expression
was "outweighed by the interest of order and morality."' 45 Nonetheless,
in opinions subsequent to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme
Court has seemingly distanced itself from its original proscription
against fighting words.
4 6
C. First Amendment Protection Does Not Extend To Obscenity.
In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court not only designated so-called
"fighting words" as unprotected speech, but also noted in dicta that
"lewd and obscene" speech fell within the "well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."'4 7 This find-
ing ultimately led the Court to its decision in Roth v. United States.4 8
In Roth, the Court quoted the Chaplinsky dicta and found that ob-
scenity was not Constitutionally protected speech. 49 The Court defined
obscenity as that which "deals with sex in a manner appealing to pruri-
ent interest." 50 To differentiate obscenity from sex depicted in art or
literature, the Court emphasized that obscene speech is that which "to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." 51 This standard became the Court's guide to determine
effort did not constitute protected speech); see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919).
43. Courts have also categorized such unprotected speech or association as that which
presents a "clear and present danger." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(Ku Klux Klan burning of crosses); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961)
(membership in an organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by
force or violence); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (presenting the renowned example of yelling
"fire" in a crowded theater as speech which would likely produce or incite imminent dan-
ger), subsequently overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). See generally Michael
A. Coletti, Note, First Amendment Implications Of Rock Lyric Censorship, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 421,
439-43 (1967) (concerning the regulation or classification of rock music lyrics).
44. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
45. Id.
46. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 131 (1974) (overturning a convic-
tion for uttering, "you goddamn motherfucking police"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
107 (1973) (holding that the statement, "[wle'll take the fucking street later .... ," was
protected speech); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (overturning a conviction
for saying, "[y]ou son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 16 (1971) (overturning a conviction for breach of the peace for wearing a jacket which
displayed the phrase, "Fuck the Draft").
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72; see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)
(noting that obscene speech, like group libel, was not protected under the Constitution).
48. 354 U.S. 476 (1957), overruled by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
49. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id. at 489.
19921
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whether certain expression constituted obscene and, therefore, unpro-
tected speech.
5 2
Affirming the Roth finding that obscene speech is unprotected, the
Supreme Court established the definitive test for obscenity in Miller v.
California.53 The test for obscene speech in Miller requires:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work de-
picts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value.
5 4
Subsequent to its decision in Miller, the Court clarified the components
of the test. The first two components, which note that obscene speech
must be "patently offensive" and "appeal to prurient interests," must be
judged in terms of "contemporary community standards" 55 and not by
national criteria. 56 Further, the Court has noted that only "patently of-
fensive, 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating
state law" can be prohibited. 5 7 Obscenity does not include items which
arouse normal sexual desires.
58
Notwithstanding criticisms by justices in subsequent cases, 59 the
Miller test continues to be the guideline used to determine whether cer-
tain forms of expression are obscene. Each component of the Miller test
must be satisfied in order to classify a work as obscene.6 0 Consequently,
speech which is found to be obscene, in accordance with the Miller test,
is not constitutionally protected.
6
52. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1966) (certain publications
were obscene since they commercially exploited erotica solely for the sake of prurient
appeal).
53. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
54. Id. at 24.
55. Id. The Court in Miller specifically noted that community standards, as deter-
mined by the jury, must be used to adjudge the offensiveness and prurient appeal of ques-
tioned expression, id. at 26, 30; see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977).
56. A "national standards" test had been adopted in a plurality opinion by the Court
injacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
57. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
58. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985).
59. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 95, 100 (1973) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (noting the
vagueness of the obscenity test and further stating "in the absence of distribution to
juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress
sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.", id. at 113).
60. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 136 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Pent-
house Int'l., Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1363 (5th Cir. 1980)).
61. The Court has modified the Miller test for obscenity in cases involving the protec-
tion of minors; see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a statute that
proscribed material which appealed to the prurient interests of minors); Butler v. Michi-
gan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (invalidating a statute that makes it a criminal offense to make
available materials which have a detrimental effect on minors).
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D. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint - Protection From Preemptive Suppression
of Questionable Expression.
Until speech or expression is ruled obscene, it must be accorded a
degree of protection from censorship or limitation. This simple require-
ment represents a significant precept of the prior restraint doctrine. 62
Even speech, which on its face is offensive and lewd, falls within the pro-
tective sphere of the doctrine. 6 3 Governmental authorities, therefore,
cannot summarily limit such questionable expression.
The case of Freedman v. Maryland64 noted the government's obliga-
tion to secure ajudicial determination of the unprotected status of alleg-
edly obscene material. Freedman delineates the minimum procedural
safeguards that prior restraints must provide in order to satisfy Consti-
tutional scrutiny: (1) the governmental authority seeking to limit the
speech or expression must initiate prompt judicial proceedings and
prove that the expression is unprotected; (2) any limitations or restraints
placed upon the expression prior to this judicial proceeding can be im-
posed for a brief period and only to maintain the "status quo;" and (3)
the governmental authority must guarantee prompt and expedient judi-
cial action.
65
Prior restraints generally take the form of licensing or permit re-
quirements, taxes, registrations, advanced publication or submission of
materials or matters for dissemination and judicial injunctions. 6 6 The
discretion of public officials who subject speech or expression to scru-
tiny has been held to produce "censoring effects" and often chills
speech before the speech is uttered. Such prior restraint has been con-
sidered repugnant to the First Amendment right to free speech. 67
62. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 596 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (cit-
ing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (reaffirming that minimal procedural
safeguards must be followed in order for a prior restraint to be deemed permissible), rev'd
on other grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992); see South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (noting that the standard
of obscenity "whatever it may have been, was not implemented by the board under a sys-
tem with the appropriate and necessary procedural safeguards"); Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980).
63. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 598 (citing Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05
(1973) (the "common thread" of the law is that where the state has removed from public
distribution arguably protected speech, the state has imposed prior restraint), rev'd on other
grounds, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502, 513 (1966).
64. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
65. Id. at 59; see Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. at 317; McKinney v. Alabama, 424
U.S. 669, 674 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 559-60.
66. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596.
67. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 552; see also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (finding that a city ordinance which prohibits public demonstra-
tions without a permit is unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958) (stating that an ordinance which requires that individuals
obtain a permit to solicit members for organizations which require the payment of dues is
unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94
(1951) (stating that an ordinance which gives the government the discretion to control
citizens' speech on religious matters is an invalid prior restraint); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451-52 (1938) (finding that an ordinance which prohibits the distribution of literature
without a permit is "invalid on its face"). In each of these cases, petitioners asked the
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In addition to concerns relevant to censorship, prior restraints
often involve licensing or regulatory schemes which have dubious,
vague or unacceptable standards governing the suppression of speech.6 8
The absence of such standards provides governmental officials with a
significant degree of discretion in the decision of whether speech or ex-
pression will be permitted at all.69 Indeed, the Supreme Court in South-
eastern Promotions, Ltd. stated that the "Court has felt obliged to condemn
systems in which the exercise of such authority was not bound by precise
and clear standards ... the danger of censorship and of abridgement of
our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials
have unbridled discretion over a forum's use."
70
Another concern evolving from the concept of prior restraint is the
delay caused by licensing or regulatory schemes. Courts have recog-
nized that various forms of speech are valuable due to the urgency and
immediacy of the idea expressed. Consequently, any delay in the pres-
entation of these ideas can destroy the value, meaning and impact of this
speech. 7 1 The delay or denial of such speech impairs the First Amend-
ment rights of the speaker and the audience. Ultimately, the community
as a whole loses.
72
Given the problems related to unfettered discretion placed in public
officials, the detriment attributable to delay and the other difficulties as-
sociated with censorship, issues of prior restraint generally include one
or more of the following factors: (1) possible dissemination or distribu-
tion of speech or expression which may be controversial because of its
content, form or manner of presentation;73 (2) application to a public
courts to provide requisite relief from "prior restraints" where public officials had forbid-
den the petitioners' use of public places to express their ideas. The officials had the power
to deny the use of a forum in advance of the actual expression.
68. Atlantic Beach Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38, 41 D.R.I. 1990); see
infra notes 92, 94, 105, 118, and 122; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965)
(indicating that the unbridled discretion of Baton Rouge authorities to prohibit parades or
street meetings is an invalid prior restraint); Irish Subcomm. v. R.I. Heritage Comm'n, 646
F. Supp. 347, 359 (D.R.I. 1986) (finding that a rule prohibiting political paraphernalia
display is violative of the First Amendment). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrurnONAL LAW, § 12-34, 1039 (2d ed. 1988); Scordato, supra note 24 at 8-9.
69. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596; Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553.
70. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553.
71. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596 (citing Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 562).
72. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596; see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486
(1965) (stating that appellants' continued defense of their Louisiana prosecution under
laws which restrict "communist activities" would impair First Amendment freedoms due to
delay); see also Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1964) (strik-
ing down a Kansas statute which permits the seizure and destruction of allegedly obscene
material); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 736-38 (1961) (finding the
lack of safeguards and, therefore, adverse effects due to the unconstitutional Missouri pro-
cedures relevant to search and seizure of allegedly obscene materials).
73. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (the expression in dispute
was a rock concert); Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 546 (the controversial expression
consisted of the proposed performance of the musical production Hair); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (the expression comprised motion pictures); Atlantic Beach
Casino, Inc. v. Morenzoni, 749 F. Supp. 38 (D.R.I. 1990) (the expression consisted of a 2
Live Crew "rap" music concert); Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 581 (the expression involved
"2 Live Crew's" album, As Nasty As They Wanna Be).
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official for use of a public forum to express ideas or for the sponsorship
of expressive activity at an establishment;74 (3) public officials' discre-
tion to grant or withhold permission for the distribution of controversial
expression via a license, permit or other such devise based upon the
content of the expression; 75 (4) approval of the application before the
expression is allowed;76 (5) approval of the application is "ad hoc,"
with an appraisal of facts, exercise ofjudgment, ind the formation of an
opinion by the public official and without judicial intervention; 7 7 and
(6) absent judicial determination of the protected status of the expres-
sion, judgment of the public official would prevent distribution or per-
formance of the contemplated expression. 78 Generally, prompt judicial
review would be required.79 The presence of these elements, either sin-
gularly or collectively, triggers the applicability of the prior restraint
doctrine. Under Freedman, the governmental official or "censor" gener-
ally bears the burden to prove the compelling need for such limitation.
In the more recent case of FW/PBS Inc. v. Dallas,s" Justices O'Connor,
Stevens and Kennedy indicated in a concurring opinion that the govern-
ment should not bear the burden of going to court to deny a license for
a sexually oriented business.81 This decision notwithstanding, the pro-
cedural requirements of the prior restraint doctrine set forth in Freedman
remain compulsory.
III. SETTING THE STAGE: FOUR PRINCIPAL CASES INVOLVING
CONTROVERSIAL EXPRESSION.
The legal dilemma of the rap music group 2 Live Crew provides an
excellent factual and legal reference for the discussion of the viability of
the prior restraint doctrine. While some legal theorists have focused on
whether 2 Live Crew's album, As Nasty As They Wanna Be, merited Consti-
tutional protection, 82 the courts' decisions in Skyywalker v. Navarro 83, At-
lantic Beach v. Morenzoni8 4 and Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro 8 5 present
74. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 781; see also Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546; Freedman,
380 U.S. 51; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. 38; Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. 578; infra note 123.
75. See infra notes 94, 122, and 128.
76. See infra notes 94, 122, and 128.
77. See infra notes 122, 123, and 128.
78. See Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 554-55; see also infra note 122.
79. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560.
80. 493 U.S. 215 (1990)..
81. Id. at 230. In FW/PBS, Inc., the Court, in a divided decision, invalidated the city's
licensing ordinance which required sexually oriented businesses to obtain approval from
the health and fire departments and the building inspectorprior to the issuance of a license.
The ordinance also failed to provide for prompt judicial review.
82. See generally Clark, supra note 17.
83. 739 F. Supp. 578, 600-01 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that an exparte application to a
state judge for an order of probable cause and an order finding that there was probable
cause to believe As Nasty As They Wanna Be was obscene were insufficient procedures to
meet the minimum due process requirements of prior restraint), rev'd on other grounds, Luke
Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. Fla. 1992).
84. 749 F. Supp. 38, 42-43 (D.R.I. 1990) (holding that a town ordinance allowing
revocation of an entertainment license "for cause shown" was an unconstitutional use of
prior restraint because the ordinance did not contain narrow, objective and definite stan-
dards to guide the licensing authority).
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textbook illustrations of the importance of the doctrine in the conflict
between freedom to express controversial ideas and governmental con-
trol of such expression. While the decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatres,
Inc.8 6 addresses nude dancing, the context of conduct and its poten-
tially close association with the performance of musical expression un-
derscores the ultimate importance of the prior restraint doctrine.
A. Skyywalker v. Navarro - Issues of Protected Speech and Prior Restraint.
In 1989, Skyywalker Records, Inc. released an album entitled, As
Nasty As They Wanna Be, recorded by 2 Live Crew.8 7 As Nasty As They
Wanna Be (Nasty) allegedly contained sexually explicit lyrics, punctuated
with crude and vulgar language.
8 8
In early 1990, residents of South Florida registered complaints with
the Broward County Sheriff's office regarding Nasty. Thereafter, the
sheriff's office investigated the content and distribution of Nasty.8 9 Dep-
uty Sheriff Mark Wichner bought a cassette tape recording of Nasty from
a retail music store in Broward County. Deputy Wichner obtained the
tape from an open rack accessible to anyone.
90
After listening to the recording of Nasty, Deputy Wichner prepared
an affidavit that included a description of the facts relevant to the tape's
retrieval. On February 28, 1990, Deputy Wichner submitted the affida-
vit, a transcription of six of the eighteen songs on Nasty and the actual
tape of the album to the Broward County Circuit Court for a determina-
tion of whether Nasty was legally obscene.9 1
After consideration of the affidavit and other submissions, including
information relevant to the accessibility of Nasty to the public, the circuit
court judge found the recording obscene pursuant to section 847.011 of
the Florida statutes and relevant case law. 92 Thejudge entered an order
to this effect.
93
The Broward County Sheriff's office then disseminated copies of
85. 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992).
86. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991).
87. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 582. 2 Live Crew is a "rap" music group whose mem-
bers include Luther Campbell, Mark Ross, David Hobbs, and Chris Wongwon. Id. Luther
Campbell functions as president, secretary, sole director and shareholder of Skyywalker
Records, Inc. which is a corporation based in Miami, Florida. Id.
88. Nasty contains such songs as: Put Her in the Buck, D..K Almighty, Dirty Nursery Rhymes,
and Bad A..B. .. H, all of which contain explicit lyrics.
89. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 582-83.
90. Id. at 583.
91. Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.07-.09 (West 1976) (generally concerned with the pro-
motion of obscene materials); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.08 (Supp. 1992) (requires probable
cause hearings when an indictment, information or affidavit is filed under §§ 847.07-.09;
permits the State attorney to apply to the court for an order to the defendant, his agent,
bailee, etc. to produce the materials for determination, and; allows a court to hold the
material for further disposition after an appropriate hearing). In the case of Skyywalker,
Deputy Wichner applied for a determination of obscenity from the court. The govern-
ment however did not adhere to the statutorily mandated procedures for such a determi-
nation. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596.
92. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596; see infra text accompanying notes 100-01.
93. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 603.
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the judge's order to retail businesses that might have sold the album.
To avoid overaggression, the sheriff's office issued warnings in lieu of
arrests to the stores regarding the distribution of Nasty. Subsequently,
officials of the Sheriff's office visited twenty-three retail establishments
including the store where Deputy Wichner bought a copy of the Nasty
cassette. During these visits, the officials wore their uniforms and dis-
played their badges to the proprietors. The officials presented a copy of
the order of the circuit court judge, his badge, and a warning that fur-
ther sales of Nasty "would result in arrest and that if convicted, the pen-
alty for selling to a minor was a felony, and a misdemeanor if sold to an
adult."' 94 Subsequently, all retail establishments in Broward County, re-
gardless of their policy of labelling the recording or restricting sales to
minors, discontinued sales of Nasty. The stores instituted this ban,
notwithstanding the insert in Nasty's packaging stating, "WARNING:
EXPLICIT LANGUAGE CONTAINED." 95
On March 16, 1990, Skyywalker Records (Skyywalker) filed suit in
the United States District Court under section 1983, Title 42 of the
United States Code.9 6 Skyywalker also sought declaration of their rights
and injunctive relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act.
9 7
Thereafter, Sheriff Navarro filed an in rem action in the Broward County
Circuit Court in an attempt to obtain a judicial determination that Nasty
was obscene.
98
Prior to a discussion of whether the sheriff's acts to discourage the
sale of Nasty in local retail stores comprised an illegal prior restraint, the
Skyywalker court performed an exhaustive determination of whether
Nasty was Constitutionally protected speech. The court, without a jury,
offered a detailed analysis of Nasty under the prevailing laws relevant to
obscenity. 9 9 Acknowledging that this right is not absolute,1 0 0 the court
ultimately held that obscene material enjoys no Constitutional protec-
tion. 10 ' Focusing on provisions of the Florida statutes relevant to ob-
scenity, 10 2 the court noted that the legislature's definition of obscenity
closely parallels that of the Supreme Court in Miller. 10 3 Recognizing the
94. Id. at 583.
95. Id. 2 Live Crew released As Clean As They Wanna Be subsequent to Nasty which
some establishments continued to sell. As Clean As They Wanna Be includes the identical
instrumental music contained in Nasty but replaced the explicitly sexual lyrics with less
graphic language. Id at 582.
96. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (provides federal, statutory relief for the wrongful
deprivation by state officials of federal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and other federal laws).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 582.
98. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 583.
99. Id. at 584-96.
100. Id. at 584 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
101. Id. at 584 (citing Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115;
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
20 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72
(1942)).
102. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 585.
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.001(7) (Supp. 1992) (defining obscenity in words which
virtually mirror those in Miller.
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criminal nature associated with obscene material, the court also ob-
served the wide prohibitions against obscenity including sale, distribu-
tion and production.
1 0 4
The Skyywalker court performed an exhaustive and comprehensive
analysis of Nasty under the Miller guidelines for obscenity. 10 5 In its de-
termination, the court found: (a) the "relevant community" whose stan-
dards would be used to evaluate Nasty would encompass Palm Beach,
Broward and Dade Counties; 10 6 (b) the "average person," by whose
standards Nasty would have to be judged, tends to be more tolerant of
obscene speech than individuals in other parts of Florida, yet the "aver-
age person's" tolerance would not be unbridled; 10 7 (c) Nasty's lyrics
have the "tendency to excite lustful thoughts" 108 and, therefore, appeal
to prurient interest; 109 (d) Nasty's graphic and frequent portrayal of sex-
ual conduct establishes the recording as "patently offensive," as evalu-
'Obscene' means the status of material which: (a) The average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) Depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct as specifically defined herein; and (c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.);
see also, Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (delineating the basic "guidelines" for the trier of fact in the
determination of obscenity).
104. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 585 (references portions of the Florida statutes which
criminalize certain uses of obscene material: § 847.07 (transporting obscene material),
§ 847.011 (1)(a) (making the distribution, sale, or production of obscene material a crime),
§ 847.011(2) (criminalizing the possession of obscene material), § § 847.012, -.0125 (out-
lawing the distribution and display of obscene materials to minors), §§ 847.013, -.0133, -
.0 135 (prohibiting exposure to minors of obscene materials), and 847.0145 (prohibiting
the buying or selling of minors)). See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 847.07, 847.01l(1)(a), 847.012-
.015 (West Supp. 1992).
105. See generally Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 587-96.
106. Id. at 587-88 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30). Before applying the "contemporary
community standards" requirement, the court examined the geographic and socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of Palm Beach, Broward and Dade Counties to conclude that those
three areas comprised the "relevant community." Id. at 588. The court pointed to such
factors as common geography, common transportation, shared access to radio and televi-
sion stations and print media and similar composition of rural and urban areas. The opin-
ion noted the area's racial, religious, gender and class diversity. The court emphasized
that the determination of the relevant community remained a judicial rather than legisla-
tive function. Id. at 587 (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977)).
107. Id. at 588-89. The court admitted difficulty in the assessment of the "average
person" standard. Nonetheless, the court recognized that this standard comprised a legal
notion which must be taken from the "aggregation or average of everyone's attitudes in
the area including persons with differing degrees of tolerance." Id. at 589 (citing Pinkus v.
United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298-302 (1978)). The court commented specifically that the
evaluation of Nasty constituted an "application of the law to the facts based upon the trier
of fact's personal knowledge of community standards." Id. at 590. Consequently, the
court concluded that its assessment of Nasty did not constitute the personal opinion of the
judge, but a reflection of an average person of the relevant area.
108. Id. at 591 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957), overruled by
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
109. Id. at 591-92. In reaching the conclusion that Nasty appeals to prurient interest,
the court closely examined the lyrics of the album. The court noted that the frequent and
graphic references to human genitalia and various bodily functions produced the prurient
appeal and served only to evoke "dirty" thoughts. Id. at 591. The court also made specific
reference to §§ 847.001(2) and 847.001(11) of the Florida statutes which depict the "sex-
ual conduct" inherent in obscene materials. Id. While the court acknowledged "2 Live
Crew's" commercial motive, it opined that this motive served to promote lustful thoughts.
Id. at 592.
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ated under "contemporary community standards;" 1 10 and (e) pursuant
to an objective, reasonable person's standard, Nasty has no social
value. " I The court ultimately concluded that, by both a preponderance
of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence, Nasty was "legally"
obscene under Florida law.'
12
Subsequent to a determination that Nasty was obscene, the court
addressed the issue of whether the sheriff's actions to discourage sales
of Nasty constituted an illegal prior restraint. 1l 3 Acknowledging that the
"line between free speech and obscenity is so subtle, that the law im-
poses a presumption that all utterances are Constitutionally protected
until there is ajudicial decision to the contrary,"" 14 the court recognized
that any suppression of even obscene materials must comport with es-
tablished procedures." 5 The court further noted that music constitutes
a mode of expression within the context of free speech and is, therefore,
entitled to protection as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 116
Noting that proper procedures must be followed prior to the
seizure of "arguably protected" material, the court recognized that the
removal of any such material in contravention of procedure constitutes a
prior restraint.1 17 Applying the federal common law rules relevant to
prior restraint to the actions of the sheriff, the court concluded that: (a)
the state judge's "probable cause" order stating that Nasty was obscene
did not comport with statutory or common law procedure and had "no
legal effect;""18 (b) the sheriff's actions constituted a seizure of pre-
sumptively protected material; 1 19 (c) the sheriff's ex parte application
to the state judge for the probable cause order and the state court
110. Id. at 592 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 30; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22
(1971)). The court relied on sexual references and the frequency with which those refer-
ences were given to conclude that Nasty .was patently offensive. Id. at 592. The court
specifically highlighted the use of "dirty words," and the music's intrusion on "unwilling"
listeners. Id. at 593. Similar to the reasoning in its finding that Nasty appeals to prurient
interest, the court noted that 2 Live Crew's commercial motive may have validity, but is
not accorded great weight in determining if the work is patently offensive. Id. at 593. C.f.
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966) (noting that the court can consider
the manner in which the material was distributed and promoted to determine if the work
appeals to the prurient interest).
111. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 593-96 (citing Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01
(1987)). Utilizing the Miller guidelines, the court concluded that Nasty lacked any literary,
artistic, political or scientific value. Id. at 593-96. The court noted that Nasty's primary
thrust is its lyrics which have no socially valuable content. Id. at 595. The court rejected
arguments that Nasty embodied cultural significance. Id. at 594. Nasty taken as a. whole
portrays graphic sexual references with no social value. Id. at 595-96.
112. Id. at 596.
113. Id. The Skyywalker court presents a classic discussion of the relevant law of prior
restraint.
114. Id. at 597 (citing Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989); Heller
v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973)).
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id. at 598 (citing the rule as stated in Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504-05
(1973); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 513 (1966)).
118. Id. at 598, 600.
119. Id. at 598-99.
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judge's issuance of the order were insufficient to guard against the dan-
gers of unconstitutional prior restraint.
120
Although ruling that Nasty was obscene, the court found that the
sheriff's actions aimed to discourage the sale of Nasty constituted an ille-
gal prior restraint which violated 2 Live Crew's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.' 2 1 The court specifically noted, however, that the
sheriff could give advice to anyone suspected of violating the state's ob-
scenity laws and could "vigorously" enforce these criminal laws.
12 2
As an arguable consequence, significant legal actions ensued after
the court's ruling in Skyywalker. Although a subsequent proceeding in
the same court regarding legal costs and fees due the respective par-
ties,1 2 3 the authorities of Broward County unsuccessfully brought crimi-
nal charges against the members of 2 Live Crew for the performance
and distribution of Nasty.124 Moreover, the Broward County authorities
successfully prosecuted a record store owner who sold copies of Nasty in
his establishment.
125
B. The Aftermath of Skyywalker v. Navarro: Atlantic Beach v.
Morenzoni - Governmental Prior Restraint.
With its ruling that Nasty is obscene under Florida statutory law,
126
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in-
tensified the debate concerning freedom of controversial musical ex-
pression and governmental regulation of such expression. Undoubtedly
this controversy haunted the band in engagements following the ruling
in Skyywalker; 12 7 therefore, when a club owner in Misquamicut, Rhode
Island, sought to sponsor a 2 Live Crew concert in the fall of 1990, it
came as no surprise that the local government attempted to thwart the
event.
Atlantic Beach v. Morenzoni 12 8 involved a privately owned and oper-
120. Id. at 600. The court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (delineating that the governmental official
must obtain judicial review prior to the suppression or seizure of an allegedly unprotected
work; that the burden of proof regarding the unprotected nature of the material in ques-
tion lies with the governmental official; that suppression before such review can be insti-
tuted for a brief period of time in order to preserve the status quo; that judicial review
must be prompt).
121. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 603.
122. Id. at 604.
123. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
124. See id.; Clark, supra note 17, at 1504 n.203. It is significant to note that an impor-
tant element of proof in the prosecution's case against 2 Live Crew in these criminal pro-
ceedings was an audio tape of the group's live performance of Nasty. Reports of the case
indicate that the lyrics in performance were largely incomprehensible. A jury found the
group not guilty of violating Florida's obscenity laws.
125. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1503; Man Convicted in 2 Live Crew Sale Closes Up Store,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1991, at 10 (record store owner forced to close his business due to
financial difficulties).
126. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596.
127. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1503 n.202.
128. 749 F. Supp. 38 (D.R.I. 1990).
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ated club in Misquamicut, Rhode Island, called the "Windjammer." 129
The Windjammer regularly booked concerts and dances for the adults
of the general public.130 Pursuant to its published ordinances, the local
town council granted the club owners a liquor and entertainment li-
cense.' 3 ' Following the Florida court's decision in Skyywalker, I3 2 the
owners of the Windjammer contracted with 2 Live Crew for a concert
engagement. The contract required the band to perform at the club on
October 6, 1990.133
Due to 2 Live Crew's considerable publicity and ignominy for
shocking and allegedly obscene lyrical content, the town council di-
rected one of the club's owners, MJ. Murphy, to appear at a public hear-
ing before the council to address the upcoming performance of 2 Live
Crew. 134 During the public hearing, council members stated apprehen-
sion concerning the themes conveyed in 2 Live Crew's music. The
council's apprehension focused on the basic moral sordidness of this
music and its "contribution to 'America's slide into the sewer.' "1135
Moreover, the members of the council expressed concern about
public safety, given the possible large number of persons who would
attend the concert and the boisterousness of the crowd.13 6 The council
concluded that the question regarding obscenity would be referred to
the Rhode Island Attorney General. Additionally, the council noted that
it would consider the revocation of the Windjammer's liquor and en-
tertainment licenses. The owners and manager of the Windjammer
thereafter requested written notice of the statutes, regulations and ordi-
nances governing such action by the council.'
3 7
The council president wrote a letter to owners of the Windjammer
and stated that a show cause hearing regarding the possible revocation
of the club's liquor and entertainment license would take place on Sep-
tember 24, 1990. The letter also detailed the apprehensions and con-
129. Id. at 39.
130. Id.
131. The Town of Westerly's ordinance governing the issuance of an entertainment
license includes the following:
§ 17-84. Shows, motion pictures, performances, dances, balls - License required
approval.
No person shall maintain, operate or conduct any show, motion picture, theatrical
performance, or other similar exhibition inside a building or structure designed,
constructed and equipped for such purpose unless such person shall have a li-
cense issued by the Town Council, and approved by the Chief of Police, the
Building Official, and Zoning Inspector; and no person shall maintain, operate or
conduct any dance or ball unless such person shall have a license issued by the
Town Clerk after approval of the Chief of Police.
Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 40 n.3.
132. Note that the controversy involving the owners of the Windjammer occurred sub-
sequent to the court's ruling on legal costs and fees in Skyywalker Records, Inc. v.
Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d
134 (11 th Cir. 1992).
133. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 39.
134. Id.
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cerns which the council had relevant to the upcoming concert. These
"concerns" included the following: (1) the adequacy of parking facilities,
special police and additional parking attendants to be provided at [the]
facility on October 6, 1990, pursuant to Section 17-43(g) Westerly Code
of Ordinances; (2) the adequacy of the club's ability to protect public
places from the incursions of others as currently prohibited by Section
19-7(a)(2) Westerly Code of Ordinances and Section 17 -43(g) Westerly
Code of Ordinances; (3) expected public safety problems regarding the
unprotected shore of the Atlantic Ocean on Atlantic Beach on October
6, 1990, Section 17-27, Westerly Code of Ordinances; (4) the club's
ability to provide an adequate number of sanitary facilities outside of the
establishment, on October 6, 1990, Section 17-43(e), Westerly Code of
Ordinances; (5) the club's ability to afford adequate avenues for fire exit
from the facility on October 6, 1990; (6) the club's ability to monitor
and control the expected 1,500 patrons, both inside and outside of the
establishment on October 6, 1990, Section 17-43(g) and Section 19-8k
of the Westerly Code of Ordinances, and applicable Fire Codes; (7) the
impact of the club's proposed entertainment of October 6, 1990 on the
ability of the Westerly Police Department to maintain its normal opera-
tions, and simultaneously maintain adequate protection and manpower
for the anticipated number of persons to attend this function. 138 As au-
thority for a show cause hearing, the council president's letter also cited
Rhode Island General Laws 5-22-2 and the Westerly Code of Ordi-
nances Section 17-87. These laws governed actions required to grant or
revoke licenses.
139
On September 19, 1990, the owners of the Windjammer filed a mo-
tion with the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the town council
from holding the show cause hearing relevant to the revocation of the
138. Id. at 40 n.l.
139. The laws cited in the Council President's letter included a Rhode Island statutory
provision and a Westerly town ordinance. The state statute included the following
language:
City and Town Licenses for Exhibitions.
Town and city councils may grant a license, for a term not exceeding one (1) year,
under such restrictions and regulations as they shall think proper, to the owner of
any house, room or hall in the town, for the purpose of permitting exhibitions,
therein, which license shall be revocable at the pleasure of the town or city council.
Id. at 40 n.2 (citing R.I.G.L. 5-22-2) (emphasis added). The two Westerly town ordinances
relevant to the issuance and revocation of an entertainment license stated the following:
§ 17-84. Shows, motion pictures, performances, dances, balls - License required approval.
No person shall maintain, operate or conduct any show, motion picture, theatrical
performance, or other similar exhibition inside a building or structure designed,
constructed and equipped for such purpose unless such person shall have a li-
cense issued by the Town Council, and approved by the Chief of Police, the
Building Official, and Zoning Inspector; and no person shall maintain, operate or
conduct any dance or ball unless such person shall have a license issued by the
Town Clerk after approval of the Chief of Police.
§ 17-87. Same - Revocation of License.
Any license granted under Section 17-84 and 17-88 [outside entertainment] may
be revoked by the Town Council after public hearing for cause shown.
Id. at 40 n.3 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 70:1
CAN THE BAND PLA Y ON?
club's entertainment license.1 40 Specifically, the club owners sought to
restrain the council from accomplishing the following actions: (1) revo-
cation of the club's entertainment license; (2) prohibition of the 2 Live
Crew concert; and (3) imposition of any special requirements on the
club's owners relevant to the forthcoming 2 Live Crew concert.141
In its decision, the district court found that the parties' controversy
primarily involved a First Amendment "facial" challenge to Westerly's
licensing ordinances. 14 2 After considering several preliminary is-
sues, 14 3 the court delineated findings regarding the merits of the pre-
liminary injunction. In consideration of the merits of the preliminary
injunction, the court noted the requirements that the club owners must
satisfy in order to prevail. 144 Within the context of the requirement that
the club owners demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the
court noted the council's burden to overcome the mandates associated
with prior restraint.
The court noted that the town council's decision to review the ef-
fects of the concert before the concert took place constituted prior re-
straint. 14 5 The court observed that any "system of prior restraints"
bears a substantial presumption that such a system is Constitutionally
invalid. 14 6 Any licensing scheme involving prior restraint must contain
140. Id. at 39.
141. Id..
142. Id. The parties to the action and the court agreed to treat the club owner's motion
as an application for a preliminary injunction. Id. Accordingly, the Council's show cause
hearing was continued pending the Court's ruling on the application for injunctive relief.
Id.
143. Id. at 40-4 1. Preliminary issues included the question of the court's jurisdiction
over the controversy. Citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939), the court noted
that jurisdiction had been properly asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, and that 28
U.S.C. secs. 2201, 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 1883 provided the requisite jurisdiction for the
court to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 40-41.
The court also addressed the Town Council's assertion that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy. Id. at 41. Essentially, the
Council opined that the case was not actionable since the club owners' license had not
been reviewed and revoked. Id. The court, however, rejected this position since the club
owners made a facial challenge to the town ordinance due to a lack of standards. Id.
The court noted that where a licensing statute vests "unbridled discretion in a govern-
ment official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity," the individual affected by
the law may challenge it facially without first applying for, and being denied, the license.
Id. at 41 (citing Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1988);
Venuti v. Riordan, 521 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (D. Mass. 1981)). The court stated defini-
tively that the 2 Live Crew concert was protected under the First Amendment. Id at 41
(citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)).
144. To prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court noted that the club
owners must demonstrate four essential qualifications:
1. Likelihood of success on the merits; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
2. Likelihood of immediate and irreparable harm if such relief is not granted;
Id. at 42.
3. The injury to be sustained by the club owners outweighs any harm occa-
sioned by the grant of injunctive relief; Id. and
4. The public interest will not be adversely affected by the grant of the injunc-
tion. Id. at 41 (citing LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 642 (1st Cir. 1983)).
145. Id. at 41 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 554-55
(1975)). The court definitively asserted that the First Amendment of the Constitution pro-
tects "2 Live Crew's" performance. Id (citing Ward, 491 U.S at 790).
146. Id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
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"narrow, objective and definite standards to guide the licensing author-
ity" in order to withstand Constitutional scrutiny.147 In granting the
preliminary injunction, the court ultimately concluded that the town of
Westerly's administrative actions constituted an impermissible prior
restraint.
14 8
C. Skyywalker v. Navarro on Appeal: Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro.
Ultimately, the members of 2 Live Crew appealed the Shyywalker
court's decision that Nasty was obscene. 14 9 The court of appeals primar-
ily examined the government's problem of proof in the establishment of
a musical work as obscene.
150
Subsequent to acknowledging the Miller test for obscenity,' 5 ' the
appellate court recognized two significant problems with the govern-
ment's case. First, the Sheriff of Broward County failed to present any
evidence in support of the obscenity charge other than a tape of Nasty.
Conversely, the members of 2 Live Crew presented four expert wit-
nesses who attested to Nasty's artistic value or lack of prurient inter-
est. 15 2 The sheriff's only proof was a cassette recording of a concert
performance of Nasty. As a result, the court of appeals concluded that
the sheriff failed to prove that Nasty lacked artistic value.'
l5
Second, the presiding judge in Skyywalker relied on his own exper-
tise to determine the community standards and to adjudge the artistic
value of Nasty. 15 4 Acknowledging the difficulty of reviewing "value
judgments on appeal,"' 155 the court of appeals noted that the record
failed to substantiate the judge's expertise in artistic or literary matters
to satisfy the last component of the Miller test.' 56 The appellate court
further opined that the lower court judge could not determine Nasty's
artistic value by merely listening to the work. 15 7 Consequently, the ap-
pellate court concluded that the sheriff did not meet his burden of
proof, even by a preponderance of the evidence. 15 8 Based on the find-
ing regarding the lower court's obscenity ruling, the court of appeals did
not comment upon the Skyywalker court's prior restraint analysis. 159
147. Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)); see supra
text accompanying notes 68, 73, and 74.
148. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42-43.
149. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135 (1992) (noting that this case com-
prised the first instance where a federal court of appeals was asked to determine whether a
musical work, containing both instrumental music and lyrics, is obscene under Miller
standards).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 136.
152. Id. at 136-37.
153. Id. at 138.
154. Id. at 137.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 138.
157. Id. at 139. The court also noted that the government need not present expert
testimony to determine whether Nasty was obscene. Id. at 137. (citing Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
158. Id. at 136, 138-39.
159. See Luke Records, Inc., 960 F.2d 134.
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D. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Limitations On Controversial Expression.
An additional consideration regarding the efficacy of the prior re-
straint doctrine in the preservation of free musical expression is the im-
pact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc. 160 Barnes addressed two Indiana establishments that provide, inter
alia, adult entertainment including nude dancing. An Indiana public in-
decency statute 16 1 requires that dancers wear "pasties" and a "G-
string" during performances.1
6 2
The two establishments which host totally nude dancers sought an
injunction in the United States District Court to prevent the enforce-
ment of the Indiana statute.16 3 The distict court originally granted the
injunction stating that the statute was facially overbroad.1 4 The court
of appeals reversed and remanded the case, stating that previous litiga-
tion prevented a challenge of the statute based upon a claim that the law
was overbroad. 165 Subsequently, the district court denied the injunc-
tion, opining that the nude dancing performed in the establishments did
not constitute "expressive activity" protected by the Constitution.'
66
On its second review of the case, the court of appeals overturned the
district court's decision noting that the First Amendment does protect
nude dancing as expressive conduct.
167
In a plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court overturned the decision of the court of appeals and as-
serted the Constitutionality of the Indiana statute which generally pros-
cribes public nudity. 16 8 The Court further stated that the nude dancing
"of the kind involved here" comprises expressive conduct which is de-
serving of "marginal[]" First Amendment protection.' 69
In determining the extent of Constitutional protection that should
be afforded to nude dancing, the Supreme Court recognized that limita-
tions on this type of expressive activity constituted a valid "time, place,
or manner" restriction.17 0 The Court then adopted the "time, place, or
160. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
161. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
162. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2458-59.
163. Id at 2459.
164. Id.
165. Id (citing Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287, 288-90 (7th Cir. 1986)).
166. Id. (citing Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F.Supp. 414, 419
(N.D.Ind. 1988)).
167. Id (citing Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989)).
168. Id. at 2460.
169. Id In reaching its conclusion that nude dancing merits only marginal constitu-
tional protection, the Supreme Court relied substantially on its opinion in Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (stating that "customary 'barroom' type of nude danc-
ing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression"); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (stating that nude dancing may be entitled to constitutional pro-
tection "under some circumstances"), and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 66 (1981) (stating that nude dancing "is not without" constitutional protection from
"official regulation").
170. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)).
The Supreme Court also noted that valid "time, place, and manner" restrictions are evalu-
ated for speech that takes place on public property which is found to be a "public forum"
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manner" test set forth in United States v. O'Brien,171 and noted that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" are combined, a "sufficiently important"
governmental interest would justify incidental intrusions on First
Amendment protected activities such as "speech."
1 7 2
Using the four-part test enunciated in O'Brien, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Indiana public indecency statute, which serves to
protect substantial governmental interests in preserving order and mo-
rality, is sustainable notwithstanding any incidental intrusions on some
expressive activity. 173 Specifically, the Court noted that: (1) the State of
Indiana has the constitutional power to regulate public indecency;
1 74
(2) Indiana's public indecency statute furthers an "important or substan-
tial" governmental interest in preserving "societal order and moral-
ity;' 75 (3) the government's interest in protecting order and morality
does not relate to the suppression of erotic messages conveyed by such
activity; 176 and (4) the statute, which incidentally restricts otherwise
free speech, is narrowly tailored to further the governmental interest.
1 77
as noted in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1991), and Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Id.
171. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (refusing to provide constitutional protection to an individ-
ual's "symbolic speech," which consisted of burning his draft card to protest the United
States's conflict in Vietnam).
172. Id. (citing Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77)).
173. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2462. The Court noted the historic origins of the proscriptions against pub-
lic nudity and the proliferation of similar statutes throughout the United States. Id. The
Court further observed that the protection of public health, safety and morals constitutes a
traditional police power of the state. Id. at 2461-62.
176. Id. at 2462. The Court recognized that the nude dancing involved presents
"speech" in the form of an erotic message. Id. at 2463. The court emphasized that the
State of Indiana's requirement that the dancers wear "pasties" and a "G-string" does not
prevent this message; it merely makes the message less graphic. Id.
177. Id. at 2463. Justice Scalia concurred in the plurality opinion, stating that laws
proscribing conduct not directly related to expression should not be subjected to custom-
ary First Amendment scrutiny. Id- Consequently, such laws should be upheld because
they have a rational basis related to moral opposition to public nudity. Id. at 2468. Justice
Souter also concurred, further opining that the governmental interest is substantial and
that the Indiana statute furthers that interest, irrespective of any proof of harmful effects
resulting from such activity. Id. at 2469-71. Souter relied substantially upon the Court's
decision in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Barnes, I11 S. Ct. at
2469-71.
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented. White
noted that the non-obscene, nude dancing in this case is protected by the First Amend-
ment, and opined that the Indiana statute reaches a substantial amount of protected ex-
pressive activity in furthering "societal order and morality." Id. at 2473. He stated that
the statute should be subject to "the most exacting scrutiny" given the impact on free
expression. Id. at 2474 (citing Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) and Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1980)). White further noted the requirement that content-based
restrictions must be drawn narrowly to further a compelling state interest. Id. (citing
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). Notwithstanding any question concerning the
level of the government's interest, he felt that the statute was not narrowly drawn. Id. at
2475. White concluded that the Indiana law basically criminalizes nude dancing. Id. at
2476.
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE SUBSTANTIATION OF THE PRIOR RESTRAINT
DOCTRINE AS A GUARD AGAINST THE PREMATURE
RESTRICTION OF CONTROVERSIAL EXPRESSION.
Although courts may exhibit a willingness to scrutinize controver-
sial musical expression, the Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach decisions sub-
stantiate the power, and overall importance, of the procedural
requirements of the prior restraint doctrine. As a result, these require-
ments comprise a powerful shield against the premature and potentially
unlawful restriction of controversial expression.
The courts' opinions in Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach note that gov-
ernment authorities' actions to prevent the dissemination of controver-
sial musical forms constitute impermissible prior restraints which violate
both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 178 Both cases contain sig-
nificant similarities and dissimilarities in the manner in which the courts
arrived at their decisions. 179 These distinctions demonstrate the signifi-
cance of the prior restraint doctrine in any attempt to restrict musical
expression. Although Barnes relates to expressive conduct, the relatively
close nexus between dancing and controversial musical expression ele-
vates the importance of the prior restraint doctrine as applied to musical
expression in a "live" context.
A. Skyywalker and Its Demise: Controversial Music as Unprotected
Expression - A Difficult Finding Which Highlights The Significance
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine.
The court in Skyywalker presented an extensive explanation of its
conclusion that Nasty is obscene pursuant to the Florida statute. Be-
cause obscene material enjoys no Constitutional protection, the
Skyywalker court, prior to Luke Records, Inc., theoretically paved the way
for the unabashed regulation of 2 Live Crew's album. The Florida stat-
utes governing obscenity provide ample legislative authority to prohibit
the dissemination of material found to be obscene.' 8 0
As the court in Luke Records, Inc. documents, there remain significant
factors which substantially minimize the impact of the court's ruling.
First, there are notable arguments opposing the correctness and legiti-
macy of the court's obscenity analysis as applied to Nasty. 18 1 Courts
more often apply the Miller standard in obscenity cases involving picto-
rial pornography as opposed to cases involving musical expression.' 8 2
Given the inherent artistic nature of music, it is difficult to find any musi-
178. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 600; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
179. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 102-03.
181. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1514-21.
182. People v. Sclafani, 520 N.E.2d 409,414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("[M]agazines contain
pictures of... masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, intercourse, homosexuality or lesbian-
ism.... [P]ictures focus almost exclusively on... genitals ... and the sparse text describes
the events taking place"); Van Sant v. State, 523 N.E.2d 229, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988);
State v. Von Wilds, 362 S.E.2d 605, 607 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). These cases involve the
display of various forms of sexual activity.
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cal composition that is totally void of literary, artistic, political or social
value. 18 3 In fact, the court of appeals in Luke Records, Inc. stated in dicta
that: ".... [W]e tend to agree with appellants' contention that because
music possesses inherent artistic value, no work of music alone may be
declared obscene .... 184 Moreover, the court in Skyywalker, in empha-
sizing the proof problem in obscenity cases involving music, indicated
that the court's decision in such matters "is not based upon the under-
signed judge's personal opinion as to the obscenity of the work, but is an
application of the law to the facts based upon the trier of fact's personal
knowledge of community standards."' 8 5 The government's burden to
prove each prong of the Miller test presents a formidable obstacle in the
determination of a musical work as obscene.
The Skyywalker court recognized the seriousness, and perhaps the
complexity, of ruling that a musical composition is obscene. The court
specifically stated that its finding of obscenity is limited to 2 Live Crew's
album, Nasty, and not to the group and its performances. As the court
observed, "it is again important to note what this case is not about.
Neither the 'Rap' or 'Hip-Hop' musical genres are on trial. The narrow
issue before this court is whether the recording entitled As Nasty As They
Wanna Be is legally obscene."' 8 6 This holding shows the court's desire
to limit its decision to a specific finding on 2 Live Crew's musical
expression. 187
As illustrated in Skyywalker, courts tend to adopt a cautious ap-
proach to any prior limitations or restraints placed upon musical expres-
sion until a formal designation of its unprotected status has been issued
by the courts. This caution appears to stem from a recognition of the
importance of First Amendment freedoms. The Skyywalker court noted,
"music is clearly a form of expression within the scope of the free speech
guaranty and thereby entitled to the presumption of constitutionality as
a form of 'liberty' protected under the Fourteenth Amendment."' 188 As
in the case of Skyywalker, courts recognize the fine distinction between
obscenity and protected speech.' 8 9 As a result, there should be no
summary limitations placed upon speech to ensure the protected status
of expression.
The concept of "arguably" or "conceivably" protected speech, as
noted in Skyywalker, constitutes a significant concept in the area of con-
183. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1519 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) and noting
the improbability that any music could fail to satisfy that part of the Miller obscenity test
requiring that a work lack artistic value).
184. Luke Records, Inc. 960 F.2d at 135.
185. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 590.
186. Id. at 594.
187. Id. The court specifically stated: "The narrow issue before this court is whether
the recording entitled As Nasty As They Wanna Be is legally obscene. This is also not a case
about whether the group 2 Live Crew or any of its other music is obscene." Id.
188. Id. at 597.
189. Id. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) ("It is always
difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are
formidable.").
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troversial musical expression. It provides that works, even those with
blatant references to sexual activity, cannot be summarily censored.19 0
Authorities must obtain a formal, judicial ruling that the work is legally
obscene.19 ' In spite of the existence of obscenity statutes, courts must
perform an extensive Miller analysis on such "arguable or conceivably"
protected speech.1 9 2 Thereafter, this analysis must demonstrate that
the musical expression in question is obscene under the Miller stan-
dard.' 93 Only after this detailed analysis is complete can the govern-
mental authority suppress such musical expression prior to
performance.1
9 4
In the abstract, the Skyywalker decision may serve to chill musical
expression. This view notes the court's novel finding that a musical
composition is obscene under Miller standards represents an encroach-
ment upon the artistic freedoms preserved by the First Amendment.1
9 5
Although Skyywalker was ultimately reversed, the court's willingness to
probe the content and merit of musical expression may signal a new
willingness in the judiciary to analyze controversial musical
expression. 196
Conversely, notwithstanding its reversal in Luke Records, Inc.,
Skyywalker could be viewed as an affirmation of the importance of free
speech and measures required to suppress even questionable expres-
sion. As noted above, Skyywalker affirms the requirement that musical
expression, regardless of its controversial nature, must be ruled obscene
or unprotected before its dissemination may be limited.' 9 7 This re-
quirement represents a strong affirmation of the procedural require-
ments under the prior restraint doctrine. Furthermore, the proof
required to substantiate a Miller analysis also minimizes the possibility
that a musical composition would be found obscene. 19 8 This burden of
proof appears to be a significant obstacle in establishing a musical work
as obscene. Consequently, Skyywalker should not constitute a "slippery
slope" which will lead to further limitations on speech.' 99
B. Atlantic Beach and Controversial Music as Protected Expression - A Clear
Finding.
Unlike Skyywalker, the court in Atlantic Beach assumed a much less
controversial view of the question of protection. While the Skyywalker
court explored the unprotected status of 2 Live Crew's album Nasty





195. See supra note 17 at 1481-85 & 1523-31.
196. See infra text accompanying note 205.
197. See supra text accompanying note 190.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 150-59 & 187-88.
199. Subsequent to Skyywalker, there have been no additional cases that have found
musical expression to be obscene and, thus, constitutionally unprotected.
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under prevailing obscenity laws in Florida,200 the court in Atlantic Beach
provided a straightforward finding that 2 Live Crew's performance en-
joys First Amendment protection. 20 1 The court relied completely upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,20 2 holding
that "[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected
under the First Amendment. ' 20 3 Consequently, governmental authori-
ties seeking to restrict dissemination of protected speech must conform
to the requirements of the prior restraint doctrine which proscribes limi-
tations on protected speech except under limited circumstances.
20 4
Unlike Skyywalker, the court in Atlantic Beach utilized a different ap-
proach to the protected speech issue. The court in Skyywalker appeared
willing to delve extensively into the content of the 2 Live Crew's musical
expression pursuant to the Miller obscenity standards. The Atlantic Beach
court, however, took a seemingly detached approach to the question.
The court's summarial acceptance of the protected status of 2 Live
Crew's performance may signal an unwillingness on the court's part to
explore the content of the group's music. Such inaction may also serve
to illustrate the federal courts' difficulty in deciding whether popular
musical forms are legally obscene.
20 5
Through their findings and discussion of the protected nature of
the musical expression involved in the cases, both Skyywalker and Atlantic
Beach illustrate the continued applicability and viability of the prior re-
straint doctrine. When speech is protected, as found by the court in
Atlantic Beach, it cannot be subject to prior restraints except under nar-
rowly defined circumstances. Unless musical expression is found consti-
tutionally unprotected, such speech must be accorded provisional
protection until its unprotected status is confirmed by the court. As the
court's decision in Skyywalker establishes, judicial confirmation of the
protected status of speech constitutes a significant element of the prior
restraint doctrine.
C. The Prior Restraint Doctrine and Its Relation to Controversial Expression.
Subsequent to their respective discussions of the protected nature
of 2 Live Crew's musical expressions, the courts in both Skyywalker and
Atlantic Beach examined the applicability of the prior restraint doc-
trine.20 6 In each case, the courts employed the federal common law ap-
plicable to the doctrine.
In the case of Skyywalker, the court's utilization of the prior restraint
200. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
201. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.R.I. 1990). The court discusses the pro-
tected nature of 2 Live Crew's performance in the context of the issue involving the club
owner's facial challenge to the town's ordinance. Id. See supra text accompanying note
142.
202. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
203. Id. at 790. See also Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48 & 62-65.
205. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1515-20. See also infra text accompanying note 215.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 113-122.
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doctrine focused on the lack of adherence to procedures that guarantee
that protected speech has not been censored. 20 7 The court emphasized
the requirement that the sheriff in Broward County adhere to the proce-
dural due process requirements in the regulation of "arguably or con-
ceivably" protected musical expression such as Nasty.
208
In effect, the Skyywalker court used its previously defined concept of
"arguably or conceivably" protected speech as a precursor to its prior
restraint analysis. The court noted that Nasty could not be seized or cen-
sored unless the precise requirements of due process were followed.20 9
In addition to recognizing the "fine line" between obscene and pro-
tected musical expression, the court also noted that, "music is clearly a
form of expression within the scope of the free speech guaranty and
thereby entitled to the presumption of constitutionality as a form of 'lib-
erty' protected under the Fourteenth Amendment." 2 10 Consequently,
regardless of the overtly explicit nature of the musical expression, such
''arguably or conceivably" protected speech cannot be suppressed or
seized without the invocation of formal judicial processes. 2 1 1 This af-
firms the importance of the procedural safeguards inherent in the prior
restraint doctrine.
The court definitively concluded that the prior restraint in
Skyywalker was unconstitutional. Because of the sheriff's failure to insti-
tute formal judicial actions,2 12 the prior restraint was neither imposed
207. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 597-98.
208. In effect, the Skyywalker court focused its discussion relevant to the prior restraint
doctrine on factor number 6 noted supra note 78 and accompanying text. See Skyywalker,
739 F. Supp. at 600-01 (emphasizing that there must be a judicial finding that Nasty is
obscene under Florida statutes prior to any seizure or limitation placed upon the distribu-
tion of such musical expression).
209. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 600-01.
210. Id. at 597 (citing Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (noting that
the musical "Hair" as theater is a form of speech);Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1952) (finding that the motion picture film is a form of speech)).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 63 & 117, and infra note 215. The court found
that the Broward County Sheriff's dissemination of the probable cause order to retail
stores, together with the warning that continued sales of Nasty may be criminally actiona-
ble, remained tantamount to a "seizure" of Nasty. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 598. The
court recognized that "seizure" did not require an actual physical transfer of the album.
Id. As in this case, the distribution of the probable cause order, together with the warning,
constituted a "constructive" seizure and was, therefore, subject to due process require-
ments. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the opinions ex-
pressed in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (administrative
commission's "blacklist" of publications sent with warnings of the commission's power to
recommend prosecution deemed an impermissible prior restraint), Penthouse Interna-
tional, Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 447 U.S. 931
(1980) (Solicitor General's use of various media forms, visits to retail establishments and
warrantless arrests to stop the sale of sexually explicit publications without priorjudicial
proceedings deemed an impermissible prior restraint), and Council for Periodical Distribu-
tors Association v. Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
827 F.2d 1483 (11 th Cir. 1987) (district attorney warned specific retailer that continued
sale of questionable material would warrant "institution" of criminal proceedings, and
"strongly suggested" that other retailers refrain from selling such materials to avoid
arrest). Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 599.
212. The failure to institute formal judicial proceedings to determine the unprotected
nature of Nasty remains enigmatic in light of the Florida statute's clear language regarding
the need for probable cause hearings. Section 847.08 of the Florida code states:
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for a brief period of time nor imposed to preserve the status quo. Thus,
2 Live Crew did not receive any guarantee or assurances that a prompt
judicial hearing would occur.
2 13
In contrast to the examination of the prior restraint in Skyywalker,
the court's analysis of the Westerly Town Council's attempt at limiting
or restraining the performance of 2 Live Crew in the Atlantic Beach case
remains straightforward and more summary in scope.2 14 Unlike
Skyywalker, the Atlantic Beach court focused on the quality of the stan-
dards which govern the attempted prior restraint. 21 5 Since the Atlantic
Beach court summarily concluded that 2 Live Crew's concert perform-
ance constituted protected speech,2 16 the court would obviously be
more predisposed to address the adequacy of standards applicable to
Whenever an indictment, information, or affidavit is filed under the provisions of
§§ 847.07-847.09, the state attorney or his duly appointed assistant may apply to
the court for the issuance of an order directing the defendant or his principal
agent or bailee or other like person to produce the allegedly obscene materials at
a time and place so designated by the court for the purpose of determining
whether there is probable cause to believe said material is obscene. After hearing
the parties on the issue, if court determines probable cause exists, it may order
the material held by the clerk of the court pending further order of the court.
This section shall not be construed to prohibit the seizure of obscene materials by
any other lawful means.
Further, §§ 847.011, .012, .013 refer specifically to the need forjudicial action in the insti-
tution of sanction under the Florida obscenity law.
213. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 601-03. The Skyywalker court also compared the sher-
iff's actions to those of the Postmaster General in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971),
where a nonjudicial officer had total discretion to initiate judicial proceedings after the
suppression of the "arguably" obscene materials. Id. at 601. In Blount the Postmaster
could intercept suspected obscene mail and hold it for an indefinite time period without
any mandatory requirement invoking judicial review. Id. The Skyywalker court stressed
that the mere guarantee or assurance of a prompt judicial determination was not sufficient.
Id. at 603. The court held that where the government intends to seize large quantites of
presumptively protected materials, due process requires an adversarial hearing before any
seizures are made. Id. (citing Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 109 S.Ct. at
929 (1989); Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1964); Marcus, 367 U.S. 717, 735-36
(1961); Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
214. Note the brevity of the Atlantic Beach court's opinion regarding the constitutional-
ity of the Town Council's prior restraint. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-43. Compara-
bly, the Skyywalker court's analysis of the sheriff's prior restraint of Nasty contains a
significantly greater degree of analysis and discussion. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603.
This distinction is compelling since Atlantic Beach focuses primarily on the attempted prior
restraint by the town council, while Skyywalker centers predominately on the unprotected
nature of the musical expression under prevailing obscenity laws. Atlantic Beach, 749 F.
Supp. at 41-43; Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603.
215. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41.
216. Id. In 1978 the State of Rhode Island codified detailed prohibitions against ob-
scenity. 1978 R.I. PuB. LAws 11-31-1 et seq. 11-31-1 ("Circulation of obscene publications
and shows") proscribes the promotion of obscene material through criminal sanctions.
The section adopts the Miller definition of obscenity. Id. Other sections of Chapter 31
include § 11-31-2 ("Forfeiture of obscene publications"), § 11-31-8 ("Entry of premises
by sheriff or deputies"), § 11-31-10 ("Sale or exhibition to minors of indecent publica-
tions, pictures, or articles"), § 11-31-12 ("Penalty for making receipt of obscene publica-
tions a condition to delivery of other publications"), and § 11-31-13 ("Injunctive
proceedings by attorney general"). However, in 1979, the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land struck down the statutory provisions because the laws "fail[ed] to meet the Miller
blueprint" and were "constitutionally overbroad." D &J Enterprises, Inc. v. Michaelson,
401 A.2d 440, 446 (R.I. 1979). Given the lack of a legal statutory predicate, the United
States District Court in Rhode Island may not have found it prudent to evaluate the musi-
cal content of 2 Live Crew's repertoire to determine the music's protected status. This
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the prior restraint involved. 2 17 The court essentially adopted the fed-
eral common law relevant to the attempted restraints placed upon pro-
tected speech. 2 18 Consequently, the town's prior restraint of 2 Live
Crew's performance must be based upon laws which have "narrow, ob-
jective and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."
219
The court in Atlantic Beach noted that the Town Council of Westerly
had a legitimate interest in regulating establishments such as the Wind-
jammer.220 The court stated the federal common law rule that "time,
place and manner restrictions on expressive activity are permissible, but
even then the regulations must be 'narrowly and precisely tailored to
their legitmate objectives'. '2 2 1 The court ultimately concluded that
Westerly's ordinances were not sufficiently specific to constitute valid
time, place and manner restrictions. 22 2 Although the Atlantic Beach
court's discussion of the town's ordinances in terms of valid "time, place
and manner" restrictions constitutes dicta, its holding remains quite
summary in explanation.
The Atlantic Beach court failed to discuss the forum question in any
substantive detail. 22 3 This omission on the court's part may have re-
sulted from the assumption that the Windjammer did not fit the defini-
tion of a public forum. 224 The court's exclusion of the public forum
discussion may also be attributed to the view that the classification of the
forum involved remains less determinative than the contemplated re-
strictions on the speech in question. 22 5 While the court acknowledged
the government's interest in regulating entertainment establishments
such as the Windjammer, it completely rejected the town council's regu-
latory attempts. Without applying the analysis relevant to valid time,
place and manner restrictions, 22 6 the court simply stated, "[t]he West-
erly licensing ordinances do not even approach the necessary level of
specificity constitutionally mandated."
227
lack of statutory guidelines may also explain the court's seeming unwillingness to evaluate
the content of the band's material.
217. Because there remained no issue regarding the protected status of the musical
expression involved, the Atlantic Beach court followed federal case precedent relevant to
the constitutionality of prior restraints in light of the presence of definitive standards. See
supra text accompanying note 65.
218. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-2.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
220. Id. at 42.
221. Id. (citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969); Toward a
Gayer Bicentennial Committee v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Foundation, 417 F. Supp.
632, 638 (D.R.I. 1976)).
222. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42.
223. Id.
224. The Windjammer Club in Atlantic Beach constitutes a private institution which op-
erated as an entertainment facility. Id. at 39. Yet, the fact that the Windjammer Club
constitutes a private establishment does not insulate it from possible restrictions. See
Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2459 (Court notes that it has applied time, place, and manner restric-
tions on "non-public" fora).
225. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-24 (2d ed. 1988).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 38, 41, 170, 171, & 222.
227. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42. Given the fact that the contemplated 2 Live
Crew performance at the Windjammer Club constituted protected speech, the restrictions
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Ultimately, the Atlantic Beach court concluded its prior restraint anal-
ysis in a discussion of the "chilling effect" that the town's actions would
have upon the free expression of others. 22 8 Unlike its discussion of
time, place and manner restrictions, the court provided a more substan-
tive explanation of the chilling effects of threatening to revoke the club
owners' entertainment license. Basically, the court adopted the com-
monly held view that such actions effectively discourage individuals or
establishments from engaging in similar protected expression. 2 29 In ef-
fect, the town council's actions would inflict "irreparable harm."
23 0
The Atlantic Beach court's discussion of the potential chilling effects
resulting from the town's threatened prosecution serves to solidify the
court's prior restraint analysis. Central to the concept of a chilling effect
is the desire to prevent the free flow of protected speech.23 ' Given the
fact that the court finds 2 Live Crew's performance protected, 23 2 any
threat of adverse action takes on greater significance. The chance of a
chilling effect resulting from governmental action would be more evi-
dent. This factor contrasts cases involving "unprotected speech such as
obscenity, libel or expression presenting a 'clear and present dan-
ger'."2 3  Such unprotected speech may be subjected to "threatened"
governmental sanction due to the very nature of the speech and the po-
tential harm of such expression.
2 34
The attempted prior restraint in Atlantic Beach poses an interesting
contrast to the prior restraint attempted in Skyywalker. The Skyywalker
case involved detailed statutory prescriptions relevant to attempted
prior restraints of obscene expression. 23 5 In Atlantic Beach, the court
manifested in the Westerly Town's ordinances lacked the requisite specificity required of
valid time, place, and manner restrictions. Id. Cf Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S.
41 (1986) (Washington, D.C., city ordinance limiting the proximity of adult movie theaters
to certain zoned areas valid time, place, and manner restriction).
228. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42.
229. Id. at 42 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1965); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
277-79 (1964) (fear of prosecution for libel could have a chilling effect upon journalists
who may refrain from publishing controversial material); Clark, supra note 17, 1523-25,
n.370-86 (citing Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment. Unraveling the "Chil-
ling Effect", 58 N.Y. U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978)).
230. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 42. The Court concluded its prior restraint analysis
with a discussion entitled "Balancing the Harms and Interests." Id. As an element of the
law relevant to preliminary injunctions, the court found that the club owners' first amend-
ment right to free expression outweighed any assumed interest of the town to protect the
public interest or to preserve the integrity of the licensing system. Id.
231. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964). See also Schauer, supra note 229, at 693.
232. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp at 41 (court unequivocally states that 2 Live Crew's
performance is protected by the first amendment).
233. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (no absolute
constitutional protection for vulgar, offensive or shocking content); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) (observing the unprotected status of obscene speech); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (discussing conduct directed to inciting imminent
lawless action); Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (noting that defamatory speech is not protected by
the Constitution); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (stating that "fight-
ing words," by their utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace).
234. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 65 & 113.
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noted that the Town of Westerly had few definitive and explicit stan-
dards which supported the imposition of a prior restraint on protected
musical expression. 23 6 Further, the governmental authority in
Skyywalker failed to follow legally sustainable standards regarding the
regulation of the unprotected musical album. 23 7 The Town of Westerly,
however, attempted to restrain 2 Live Crew's performance pursuant to
ordinances that were woefully inadequate.
23 8
In spite of their distinctions, both Skyywalker and Atlantic Beach serve
to support the basic thesis that the prior restraint doctrine remains a
formidable obstacle to the attempted limitations placed upon musical
expression. 23 9 Both cases confirm that the prior restraint doctrine's ad-
herence to basic due process tenets remains a significant legal tool to
ensure freedom of musical expression.
240
D. Barnes Demonstrates the Importance of the Prior Restraint Doctrine.
At first glance, the Barnes decision could be viewed as inapplicable
to Constitutional issues involving musical expression. The Court fo-
cused its analysis on expressive activity involving nude dancing. Such
activity can more likely be seen as conduct in lieu of speech which the
Court appeared to provide greater protection.24 1 Since musical expres-
sion more closely embodies "speech" instead of "nonspeech," 242 Barnes
may be inapplicable to such expression. Furthermore, the Court's find-
ing that the government's interest in protecting order and morality justi-
fied incidental impacts on protected expression may be confined to
nudity in public.
24 3
The Barnes decision, however, could have a significant impact on the
236. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
238. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42.
239. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42. See also
supra text accompanying note 214.
240. Shyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596-603; Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 41-42. See also
Oklahoma Publishing. Co. v. District Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam) (pretrial order
prohibiting news media from disseminating name or picture of boy, subject of a juvenile
proceeding, unconstitutional); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (court
order barring news media from publishing facts strongly implicating defendant in murder
case unconstitutional prior restraint); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (per curiam) (striking down court order barring publication of "classified" gov-
ernment document for failure of government to rebut "heavy presumption" against valid-
ity of prior restraint); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971)
(temporary injunction stopping individual from distributing leaflets concerning "panic
peddling" of real estate agent an unconstitutional prior restraint). See also Scordato, supra
note 24, at 5-6.
241. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991). The court emphasized the lower protection
afforded "nonspeech" or conduct. Id. Compare id. at 2463-67, where Justice Scalia em-
phasizes that conduct merits no First Amendment application. See also supra note 67 (de-
lineating cases noting the heavy presumption against prior restraints of speech).
242. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 361, 376-77
(1968)).
243. The Court appears to place great weight on the history of public indecency. stat-
utes which "reflect the moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among stran-
gers in public places." Id. at 2461. The Court also notes that a large number of states
have such statutes. Id.
19921
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permissible restrictions placed upon controversial musical expression.
The Court appeared more willing to grant greater latitude and leniency
to governmental authorities in implementing content-based regulations
of expressive conduct where the governmental interest is "signifi-
cant. '"244 Notwithstanding the categorization of the governmental in-
terest involved, Barnes demonstrates the Court's present tendency to
evaluate the content of the expression.
24 5
Irrespective of questions regarding the importance of terminology,
it appears significant that the Court requires the government to have a
"substantial" rather than "compelling" interest where the regulation is
clearly content-based. 24 6 The Court's rationale could be particularly
applicable to musical performances containing objectionable conduct as
well as speech.
24 7
Barnes indicates that a significant or "sufficient" governmental inter-
est may excuse any tangential limitations placed upon protected
speech.248 Relying solely upon the Court's opinion in United States v.
O'Brien,249 the Court opined that governmental interests in regulating
"nonspeech" such as expressive conduct would justify any incidental in-
trusions upon protected "speech. '2 50 The Court thus found that the
State of Indiana's goal to eliminate public nudity excused any restric-
tions placed upon protected "speech" or messages conveyed in the
dance.
25 1
For controversial musical acts such as 2 Live Crew or even other
less controversial artists, this substantiation by the Court poses an in-
triguing dilemma. While the Court's ruling may not infringe upon the
musical compositions of these artists, it may limit the live communica-
tion of these works if they are performed in a manner which impinges
upon "sufficiently important" governmental interests. Such interests
may include performance of the musical composition in violation of
state or local laws proscribing public nudity25 2 or projection of sound
244. Id. at 2462-63.
245. Id. at 2460. The court notes specifically that the type of nude dancing performed
in the plaintiffs' establishment is deserving of marginal constitutional protection. Id.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 174-76. See also Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2472
(dissent).
247. The factor could be illustrated in controversial musical performances such as
"Hair" which include nudity. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. 546 (1975); see
also supra text accompanying notes 123 & 126-34. This problem concerning the combina-
tion of conduct, i.e., dance or movement, and musical expression may also surface with the
staging of the long-running Broadway musical "Ohl Calcutta!," a risque musical that in-
cludes frontal nudity. See also infra note 261.
248. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77) ("symbolic speech"
or "expressive conduct" not entitled to full constitutional protection). The Court quotes
from O'Brien: "[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id.
249. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2463.
252. Id. at 2456.
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volume.2 53 The communication of these works could be effectively lim-
ited if the performance contravenes sufficient governmental interests.
2 54
The Court's willingness to relegate conduct to a lesser threshold of
Constitutional protection may, at the very least, subject the performance
of controversial music forms to extreme scrutiny if not limitation. While
limitations imposed by governmental interests must be "content-neu-
tral," 25 5 governmental entities may be able to limit the message of the
music by sanctioning the "conduct" manifested in performance.
Barnes clearly established a lesser Constitutional standard for "non-
speech" or expressive conduct. 25 6 This holding of the Court may be
considered significant, and perhaps somewhat contradictory, in light of
the Court's precedent upholding First Amendment protection for vari-
ous forms of symbolic or "nonspeech." 2 57 Nonetheless, this lower
threshold for expressive conduct creates a compelling question for mu-
sical expression that is performed. As the Court recognized, an impor-
tant governmental interest in limiting expressive conduct or
"nonspeech" may justify incidental encroachments upon constitution-
ally protected speech.2 58 While the Barnes holding noted its application
253. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800-01 (1989). In Ward the Court
noted that the City of New York's requirement that sound for a group's live performance
must be controlled by city personnel bespeaks the city's "substantial interest in protecting
its citizens from unwelcome noise." Id (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984): "[G]overnment 'ha[s] a substantial interrest in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.' "). It also found support in Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1987) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)):
"This interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to protect " 'the well-
being, tranquility, and privacy of the home.' ."
254. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63. In past cases, the Supreme Court upheld content-
based limitations on speech where a significant governmental interest was present. See
supra note 233. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (allowing the federal
government to prohibit partisan political speeches on military installation); Lehman v.
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974) (plurality opinion) (finding that city transit
system that rents commercial advertising space on its vehicles did not have to accept parti-
san advertisements). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (statutes proscribing
flag burning unconstitutional if flag burning comprises part of political protest).
255. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
256. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63.
257. The Supreme Court has recognized that a number of forms of expressive conduct
warrant First Amendment Protection. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990)
(allowing an individual to burn the American flag to protest various aspects of the United
States's domestic and foreign policy);Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (statutes proscribing flag burn-
ing unconstitutional where flag-burning comprises part of political protest); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (hanging of inverted American flag with
peace symbols from window protected); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969)
(peaceful demonstrations by African Americans for school desegregation protected);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black
arm bands by students protesting American involvement in the Vietnam conflict pro-
tected); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (upholding constitutional protection for
silent sit-in by African Americans demonstrating against a racially-segregated library);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (permitting Jehovah
Witness children to refuse to salute the American flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931) (displaying red flag as symbol of opposition to government constitutes pro-
tected expression). The court's protection of such "nonspeech" has also led to the protec-
tion of potential offensive or inflammatory conduct. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
258. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
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to expressive conduct, the Court's allowance for incidental abridgement
of protected speech creates a compelling situation for the performance
of controversial musical expression or other forms of speech that are
performed.
The most telling observation in the Court's "incidental abridge-
ment" rule is the effect on the performance of controversial speech. As
noted, the Court has dealt with the performance of the controversial
musical production of "Hair" in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.259
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. criticized the governmental authorities' fail-
ure to adhere to procedural safeguards preventing unwarranted prior
restraint.2 60 However, given the present holding in Barnes regarding
"incidental abridgement," the Court may scrutinize and limit the ex-
pression of controversial performances such as "Hair." This issue may
surface in the immediate future given the attempt to stage the contro-
versial musical, "Oh! Calcutta! ", in the very same Chattanooga, Tennes-
see theatre where "Hair" originally came under attack. 26 1 The Court's
findings in Barnes may have significant ramifications upon the perform-
ance of controversial musical acts including certain musicals and groups
such as 2 Live Crew.
More significant may be a signal of the Court's willingness to probe
and interpret the content of expression to determine the degree of in-
trusion on expressive activity.2 6 2 The Court seems willing to allow re-
strictions which not only sanction unprotected speech such as nudity,
but also protected expression, i.e., nude dancing, which is "in the outer
perimeters of the First Amendment." 26 3 If such latitude is justifiable,
musical expression that includes controversial conduct may also be af-
fected. Consequently, references to the government's interest to pre-
vent an "evil" embodied in a limited extent in otherwise protected
expression may be considered scanty reasoning substantiating restric-
tions which proscribe a "significant amount of protected expressive
activity."1264
If the post-Barnes era ushers in more detailed scrutiny of controver-
sial musical expression, the basic tenor of the prior restraint doctrine
259. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
260. Id. at 562 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974);Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153 (1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)).
261. "Oh! Calcutta!" is a long-running musical which includes scenes with frontal
nudity. Testimony Begins in "Oh! Calcutta! " Case, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, A5. Despite
strong criticism, a Chattanooga, Tennessee promoter has sought to present the risque
musical at the Tivoli Theater, the very same venue where "Hair" created a controversy in
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. Id. See also Jack Broom & Anne Koch, Applause from Foes of Nude
Dancing Local Activists Cheer Supreme Court Ruling, SArLE TIMEs, June 22, 1991, Al.
262. Note the Court's observance that "the requirement that the dancers don pasties
and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply
makes the message slightly less graphic" demonstrates the Court's willingness to interpret
the impact of governmental restrictions on the message intended to be conveyed. Barnes,
111 S.Ct. at 2463.
263. Id. at 2460.
264. Id. at 2473 (White, J., dissenting)
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will remain an obstacle to restrictions on protected speech. Judicial de-
termination of the protected nature of the musical expression will still
be required, with the courts exercising the detailed analysis required to
establish that such expression is unprotected.2 65 While the prior re-
straint doctrine may have problems relating to its definition and scope,
it remains a necessary tool to ensure that protected musical activity is
unrestricted.
E. Prior Restraint Doctrine - A Guardian With Possible Flaws.
Although Skywalker and Atlantic Beach affirm the importance of the
prior restraint doctrine, challenges remain to the continued viability of
the doctrine. 26 6 One criticism of the prior restraint doctrine focuses on
the lack of a substantive distinction between true "prior restraints" and
laws which impose sanctions on the speaker after making the speech.
26 7
Given the diverse instances where the Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine, this criticism appears valid.26 8 This criticism also observes
that prior restraint laws present no more of a chilling effect than laws
imposing sanctions after the expression was uttered.
26 9
While the basic definition of prior restraint is significantly broad,
270
the doctrine remains an important and imposing impediment to the sup-
pression or limitation of musical expression. There appears to be little
ambiguity concerning attempts to prevent the sale of a controversial mu-
sical composition 27 1 or the discretionary limitations placed upon a pro-
posed musical performance.
2 72
While both prior restraint and subsequent sanction laws impose
chilling effects, prior restraint laws have the greater potential for delay-
ing expression. Delay of expression imposed by the prior restraint laws
265. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
266. Scordato, supra note 24, at 8-9, nn.37-42.
267. In his article, Professor Scordato specifically states:
The fundamental problem with the contemporary doctrine of prior restraint is
that the distinction upon which the doctrine rests-the distinction between prior
restraints and subsequent sanctions-lacks sufficient substance to support a cate-
gorical legal rule. The distinction . . . fails to provide a means of identifying a
category of potentially speech-suppressive government activities that is in any
way meaningful for first amendment purposes. As a result, the prior restraint
doctrine lacks the reliability and predictability of application necessary to support
constitutionally protected speech. It is, in effect, a distinction without a
difference.
Id. at 8.
268. For cases where courts have utilized the prior restraint doctrine in a variety of
contexts see Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. 578, Navarro, 742 F. Supp. 638, and Atlantic Beach,
749 F. Supp. 38. See also Scordato, supra note 24, at 6-7; supra text accompanying notes 25-
34.
269. Scordato, supra note 24, at 16. See also Kabakow, supra note 17, at 681 (where the
author criticizes the holding in Gascoe, Ltd. v. Newtown Township, 699 F.Supp. 1092 (E.D. Pa.
1988), since a lack of procedural safeguards was the sole basis for the court's invalidation
of a town's obscenity ordinance).
270. Prior restraints are generally defined as governmental limitations placed upon ex-
pression before utterance. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596 (citing Times Film Corp. v. City
of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 55 n.2 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
271. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 597-600.
272. Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. at 40.
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constitutes a significant impact on the effect or meaning of the commu-
nication. This can be particularly true in cases involving popular music,
where popularity of the musical compositions and the groups that per-
form the music may fluctuate dramatically over short periods. Skyywalker
recognizes the critical impact of delay imposed by prior restraints:
Many forms of speech are of value because of the urgency and
immediacy of the idea expressed. Even if a censor ultimately
allows publication, significant delay in the decision-making pro-
cess can destroy the fleeting value of the speech... If speech is
delayed or denied, the rights of both the speaker and his audi-
ence are impaired and society is the ultimate "loser."
2 73
Consequently, the prior restraint doctrine remains a vital tool to protect
against the imposition of arbitrary decisions in the attempted suppres-
sion of musical expression.
274
F. Effectiveness of Prior Restraint Safeguards: Emphasis on Promptness of
Judicial Review.
The controversy surrounding 2 Live Crew and the ultimate federal
decisions discussed above accentuate the importance of time as a key
element in the effectiveness of the prior restraint doctrine. It appears
critical that the procedural requirements of the prior restraint doctrine
attach at the first instance of governmental action regarding the musical
expression. The promptness of the government in obtaining a judicial
determination of the protected status of a musical work can be essential
in minimizing the chilling effects of unlawful suppression.
As noted in Section II, D of this article, the value of expression
often relates to the immediacy of the expression. 2 75 Any delay in the
dissemination of such speech not only alters the effect of the message,
but also discourages the speaker of the message.2 76 Such delay is likely
to have an adverse effect on musicians in the performance of musical
works. As a result, the procedural requirements of the prior restraint
doctrine must attach at the instant that governmental action is contem-
plated. 277 This notion of promptness in the adherence to procedural
requirements constitutes perhaps the most important mechanism in the
prevention of musical censorship.
273. Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 596 (citing Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 562; Dom-
browski, 380 U.S. at 479, 486 (1965); Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717,
736 (1961); Quantity of Copies of Books, v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 214 (1964)). See also
Atlantic Beach, 749 F. Supp. 38.
274. In spite of the criticism concerning the prior restraint doctrine, Professor Scor-
dato also acknowledges the benefits of the prior restraint doctrine in invalidating laws
whose restrictions are overbroad and impinge upon protected speech. See Scordato, supra
note 24, at 16.
275. See supra text accompanying note 71.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 71 & 72.
277. See Freedman, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). This concept of promptness also relates to
the judicial decision regarding the protected status of the expression in question.
Skyywalker, 739 F. Supp. at 603 (citing Teitel Films Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968);
Fort Wayne Books Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1963); Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. 205, 210-
11 (1964); Marcus, 367 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1961); Evans, 642 F. Supp. 552 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
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A criticism of the prior restraint doctrine as delineated by case law
to date must be the lack of a definitive explanation as to when a judicial
determination must be sought on the protected status of speech. The
mere statement that the governmental entity seek "prompt" judicial ac-
tion does not effectively provide for an immediate determination. In or-
der to prevent the unwarranted suppression of musical expression, the
procedural requirements of the prior restraint doctrine must attach at
the first instance of governmental action.
In Skyywalker, Deputy Wichner's initial preview of Nasty and his sub-
mission of an affidavit to the lower court should have triggered the for-
mal procedures for review. 27 8 Such governmental scrutiny regarding
Nasty merits immediate judicial review to prevent unlawful suppression.
While the court in Skyywalker noted this concept of promptness, 2 79 it
failed to emphasize the importance of the prompt institution ofjudicial
action.28 0 Moreover, the Florida statutes that codify the procedural re-
quirements inherent in the prior restraint doctrine must be amended to
ensure that these procedures are invoked at the first instance of govern-
mental action.28 1 Regardless of possible debates concerning what con-
stitutes "governmental action," the requirement that judicial review
occur promptly remains essential to the effectiveness of the prior re-
straint doctrine in the prevention of unlawful censorship of musical
expression.
28 2
278. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
279. Shyywalker 739 F. Supp. at 603.
280. Itt at 600 (where the court noted only that the sheriff's actions were "insuffi-
cient," failing to comment on the importance of securing prompt judicial review.).
281. Consequently, Florida Code § 847.08, which prescribes the requirement ofjudi-
cial review for questionable expression, can be amended as follows (changes in brackets [
1):
[As soon as] an indictment, information, or affidavit is filed [by any state or local
governmental official] under the provisions of §§ 847.07-847.09, the state attor-
ney or his duly appointed assistant [shall promptly] apply to the court for the
issuance of an order directing the defendant or his principal agent or bailee or
other like person to produce the allegedly obscene materials at a time and place
so designated by the court for the purpose of determining whether there is prob-
able cause to believe said material is obscene. After hearing the parties on the
issue, if the court determines probable cause exists, it may[, subject to a prompt
and speedy proceeding,] order the material held by the clerk of the court pend-
ing further order of the court.
See supra note 211 for the complete original text of § 847.08 of the Florida Code.
282. The question of "governmental action" comprises a compelling question as a trig-
ger for the invocation of procedural safeguards. The controversy surrounding the rap
artist, Ice-T, and his song, Cop Killer, presents an absorbing question as to whether "official
governmental action" has occurred. See supra text accompanying notes 3 & 11. Advocates
for the artist could argue that the public comments, particularly those by Fraternal Order
of Police members who indicate that the song incites violence against police, effectively
"seizes" Cop Killer without a judicial determination as to its protected status. The record
company's withdrawal of the song from the artist's album underscores the argument that
the work has been seized. This argument also begs the question as to whether the state-
ments by those individuals constitute official governmental actions, particularly if such
statements are made in their capacities as private citizens. It is interesting to note that Eric
Clapton's 1974 hit song, I Shot the Sheriff, which contains lyrics describing violence against
a law enforcement official, did not garner the criticism leveled against Ice-T's song, Cop
Killer.
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V. CONCLUSION
The prior restraint doctrine remains a viable and formidable me-
dium in the preservation of unrestricted musical expression. Under the
doctrine, governmental authorities that seek to limit controversial forms
of musical expression must comport with the doctrine's stringent re-
quirements, including the judicial determination of the protected nature
of expression. These requirements also mandate the existence of nar-
row, objective and precise standards for limitations on such expression.
Skyywalker and Barnes bespeak a new proclivity of the judiciary to
engage in a more probative review of the content of expressive activity.
Moreover, courts have indicated a willingness to lessen the degree of
governmental interest required to substantiate content-based restric-
tions on certain types of expressive activities. These factors do not,
however, diminish the importance, relevance or impact of the prior re-
straint doctrine. Regardless of the perceived objectionable nature of the
work, the doctrine mandates a threshold review and finding of a musical
expression's lack of constitutional protection prior to the imposition of
any restrictions. Notwithstanding its flexible definition, the prior re-
straint doctrine remains a primary legal tool that prevents the unfet-
tered, and perhaps unwarranted, censorship of musical expression.
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